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SUMMARY 
The year 2010 saw Belarus gradually being pulled out of cyclical recession owing to 
the revival of external markets and massive incentives provided by the economic 
authorities. However, the administration set itself a priority task of reaching ambitious 
GDP and income growth targets while largely ignoring economic requirements for 
sustainable and fast paced long-term economic development. Moreover, the 
investment expansion scenario formulated by the government, which envisaged 
measures to restrain the accumulation of structural disproportions, de facto was not 
implemented, as some of its prerequisites proved unfeasible. The outcome was 
twofold: on the one hand, the campaign to reach quantitative indicators resulted in 
quite impressive GDP and income growth figures; on the other hand, new 
disproportions in the economy were created, and those already in existence were 
enhanced. The problems of the foreign account deficit, external debt, money market 
imbalances, inflationary potential, fragile financial standing of domestic companies 
had therefore aggravated by early 2011. These problems put a question mark over 
both current macroeconomic stability and long-term sustainable growth.  
Tendencies:  
 High GDP and income growth in 2010 was artificially propelled by 
unprecedented arrangements to stimulate the economy;  
 New structural disproportions were accumulated and existing misbalances 
were enhanced as a result of the campaign to stimulate the economy;  
 In the fiscal sector, the “room for maneuver” almost disappeared, which will 
limit possibilities for the use of fiscal instruments to overcome shocks in the 
future;  
 Stronger imbalances of the current account, widening external deficit, limited 
possibilities for improving the financial situation at Belarusian enterprises, and 
low level of savings produce a profound negative impact on prospects of the 
country’s economic growth.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The global recession marked something of a Rubicon for the Belarusian authorities, 
which can be associated with modifications in the economic expansion model. The 
chief growth factors Belarus used to have in the lead up to the crisis (that is, prior to 
2008) were the special terms of energy trade and preferential access to the Russian 
commodity markets. The aftermath of the crisis resulted in major adjustments in 
competition mechanisms on foreign markets, including Russian commodity outlets, 
and Belarusian exporters saw their positions deteriorate. Furthermore, for Belarus 
the recession period coincided with a number of unfavorable shocks that appeared to 
be more political than economic. Those included changes in the terms of trade in 
Russian crude oil and substantial increases in Russian natural gas fees.  
The active economic policy aimed at surmounting the recession in 2009 impeded the 
development of adaptive reactions in the economy that could have helped the 
country deal with the accumulated disproportions. The foreign trade deficit remains 
the cornerstone of these disproportions, leading to stronger/new additional structural 
misbalances – a buildup in foreign liabilities, increase in financial dollarization, etc. 
The excessive efforts to encourage domestic demand in 2009 led to new 
disproportions, including the accumulation of additional risks in the banking system.  
The depletion of old growth factors alongside the accumulation of new structural 
misbalances affecting the growth prospects therefore reduced the potential of the 
Belarusian economy.  
Given those prerequisites, the economy could have done away with misbalances and 
got closer to the long-term equilibrium level in 2010 if “natural” economic 
mechanisms had been employed, the “natural” scenario envisaging a relatively 
modest GDP growth, from 1% to 4% year-on-year, based on various methodologies.  
The said scenario did not fit in the plans of the economic authorities, formulated 
mostly based on political reasons. The forecast for the election year of 2010 had 
been presented by the economic authorities back in December 2009; the country’s 
top economic managers were eager to target an 11–13% GDP growth and an 
increase in real personal incomes by 14–15% on the year. Therefore, the economic 
theme line of the year 2010 was the race for quantitative economic parameters, with 
economic policy instruments being the chief factors of macroeconomic dynamics 
rather than natural economic mechanisms.  
2. MACROECONOMIC DYNAMICS  
The economic policy scenario called for an expansion from the start of the year, 
similar to what the country saw in 2009. At the beginning of 2010, the Belarusian 
economy pulled out of cyclical recession, and given that economic position, it is hard 
to account for the expansionary policy that the country made its priority. The potential 
points of macroeconomic misalignment emerged at the turn of 2009, indicating the 
results of the incentives-based economic policy: foreign trade performance 
deteriorated, the domestic foreign exchange market saw a deficit that rapidly 
expanded, the ruble exchange rate pressures built up, and so did inflationary 
pressures. The government was well aware of the corresponding risks and sought a 
balance between the political reason for boosting GDP growth and the need to 
minimize the accumulated macroeconomic disproportions. Under the circumstances, 
in a bid to work out a compromise, the authorities opted for capital investments as a 
priority component of aggregate demand. Below are the key ideas of the 
government’s macroeconomic dynamics scenario.  
Firstly, a growth based on investments had a potential for facilitating a long-term 
growth in productivity, thus contributing to the resolution of some structural economic 
problems.  
Secondly, a growth in investments seemed the most realistic plan, because the 
government kept to itself direct instruments to stimulate the investment activity of 
companies, especially budget financing, promotion of bank credit, etc. 
Thirdly, this scenario envisaged restraints of accumulating disproportions at the 
macro level, primarily the additional foreign trade deficit, through administrative 
reductions in the domestic demand elasticity of import. For instance, by using its 
levers to shape the investment policy of the nonfinancial sector, the state is in a 
position to channel financing primarily into the investment projects that require 
minimum spending on imported investment products.  
Fourthly, the impact of stepped up investment efforts on price is, as a rule, not as 
significant as that of, say, encouraged consumer demand. The scenario therefore 
provided for measures to anchor inflation.  
Fifthly, the investment growth scenario prioritized foreign investments as the main 
source of capital investment financing, which by definition was supposed to foster 
stability on the domestic foreign exchange market.  
This scenario, however, was impeded by not only a reduction in the growth potential, 
but also the relatively unfavorable market situation.  
Firstly, the external demand for most Belarusian traditional exports restored only 
partially, and the process took some time.  
Secondly, a new oil shock came at the start of the year, when Russia adjusted its 
terms of oil trade with Belarus. This automatically affected the country’s trade 
balance (according to our estimates, in terms of the 2009 export mechanism, net 
export revenue loss1 amounted to around USD 1.8 billion, or 3.1% of GDP in 2010). 
Furthermore, the oil shock caused a drop in budget revenues, which shrank by an 
estimated USD 2 billion in annualized terms, according to the Ministry of Finance’s 
reports. 
Thirdly, another prerequisite of the investment growth scenario proved inconsistent 
later, namely, additional inflows of foreign investments, mainly FDI. The authorities 
had planned to attract foreign capital investments at least 23–25% in excess of the 
2009 level. That major increase called for about USD 4 billion in financing of capital 
investments from external sources.  
The government believed China could become a major investment contributor, 
enabling this country to meet the ambitious investment targets. Framework 
agreements with potential Chinese investors and banks make it possible for Belarus 
to take out up to USD 15 billion in Chinese resources to finance investment projects 
in various sectors of the national economy. Nevertheless, only a tiny part of those 
resources was provided. Therefore, the mission to ensure a fast significant growth in 
gross domestic product was complicated by not only the slow recovery of demand in 
partner countries, but also a number of additional adverse shocks. 
In the first half of the year, a crucial tendency towards a “redistribution” of roles in the 
structure of domestic demand emerged amid persisting difficulties with the 
                                            
1
 We compare the actual results of import and export of crude and refined oil in 2010 with the scenario 
envisaging unchanged crude oil import terms compared with 2009, and, consequently, identical import and 
export volumes (at the 2009 level, that is, 21.5 million metric tons of imported crude and 15.5 million metric 
tons of exported refined oil). 
implementation of the investment growth scenario. During that period, a number of 
factors, such as the adaptation to the crisis, decline in negative expectations about 
the external environment and acceleration in personal income growth resulted in a 
faster increase in households’ consumption. Throughout most of the year (the trend 
gradually subsided towards the end of the year) the propensity to consume appeared 
to grow, that is, households were increasing the share of consumption in their 
incomes, and consumption growth outstripped the expansion of incomes. 
Various schemes can be employed to explain the said trend. On the one hand, we 
can mention consumer optimism and positive expectations2, which promoted 
consumer enthusiasm. On the other hand, the propensity to consume may be 
partially attributable to negative expectations, for instance, of a rise in prices and 
curtailment of spending power in the future, which naturally encourages immediate 
consumption. 
We believe both groups of factors account for the increase in propensity to consume. 
As a result, household consumption became the key factor of GDP growth based on 
demand from the very start of the year. By October 1, 2010, household consumption 
had accounted for 5.1 percentage points out of the 6.6% GDP growth in year-on-year 
terms. In the last three months, propensity to consume stabilized and even 
decreased a bit amid a substantial growth in household incomes resulting from the 
directed wage push. In January-December, household consumption remained the 
key demand-based GDP growth factor. 
Another essential element of domestic demand – capital investments – was showing 
reverse dynamics: they tended to shrink at the start of the year making a negative 
contribution to GDP growth, however, the second quarter saw the growth in capital 
investments resume (it picked up pace towards the end of the year). In early 2010, 
the economic authorities, pinning high hopes on foreign investment inflows, 
somewhat alleviated the credit boom in the national economy by way of reducing the 
intensity of directed lending and pursuing a relatively rigid monetary policy. Since 
bank loans have dominated among all sources of capital investment financing, that 
policy resulted in limited implementation of some investment projects by non-financial 
businesses. 
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 The same process may be characterized as consumer behavior getting back to “normal”, which is 
attributed to the exhaustion of negative expectations of the recession period. 
The authorities had to resume and broaden the practice of directed lending later in an 
attempt to promote GDP growth amid shortages of foreign resources to finance 
investment projects. In order to keep the banks servicing state programs from 
liquidity shortages and encourage lending by privately owned banks, the National 
Bank in the second half of the year mitigated its monetary policies and allowed active 
refinancing of commercial banks. As a result, gross capital formation became the 
fastest growing element of domestic demand in the final months of the year. 
On the back of the state’s support for domestic demand came a considerable 
increase in import demand. Whereas in the first quarter net export contribution to 
GDP growth was positive, that is, the trade deficit was smaller than in the first three 
months of 2009, in the final three quarters, the deficit grew. In 2010, the reliance of 
the Belarusian economy on imports revealed itself stronger than before, as a 
substantial part of artificially backed demand was for imported commodities rather 
than domestically made products. 
This dependence was manifested both directly and indirectly. In the former case, 
economic agents showed demand for final products and gave preference to imported 
commodities. The latter mechanism presupposes a demand for domestically made 
goods, which on the one hand promotes the real sector’s output, but on the other 
hand ultimately leads to an increase in imports, since many of the Belarusian made 
commodities rely on supplies of foreign raw materials and components. As a result, 
net exports’ negative contribution to GDP dynamics appeared to be commensurable 
to the positive contribution of household consumption or gross capital formation. 
The economic model of artificial promotion of GDP growth by way of encouraging 
domestic demand therefore proved inefficient even in the short term, because much 
of the demand created by the authorities was for imported commodities rather than 
domestic production. Furthermore, that approach aggravated the problems with 
financing of the economy’s balance of payment deficit.  
3. REAL SECTOR 
Of all the sectors of the national economy, the manufacturing sector, construction, 
transport, communication, retail and public catering contributed most to GDP growth 
in 2010. 
Similar to the previous year, the production sector, by far the largest economic 
sector, expanded faster than the average for the national economy. The fastest 
developing industries were mechanical engineering and metalworking, with a 16.7% 
growth year-on-year, the ferrous metals industry with 16%, forestry, woodworking 
and pulp and paper industry with 14.9%, chemical and petrochemical industry with 
13.3%, and electricity industry with 12.9%. The two largest industrial sectors are 
mechanical engineering and metalworking and the chemical and petrochemical 
segment. Those two became the key sources of growth, fueling the entire 
manufacturing sector. 
The impressive growth of mechanical engineering was a result of the “recovery” 
growth in the automotive sector. In other words, following a major drop in partners’ 
demand and stagnation of 2009, the modest recovery of partner countries and the 
poor performance in the previous period caused a vigorous growth in year-on-year 
terms. The considerable expansion of the automotive sector was recorded amid the 
unsettled problem of excessive inventories: as of early 2011, stocks of finished 
products of Belarusian automotive companies stood at BYR 643.3 billion, or 154.4% 
of the average monthly output. 
Another important contributor to the overall industrial growth was the food processing 
industry, despite the modest expansion of 9.5% on the year. The meat industry was 
the leader in terms of growth with 13.1%, mostly owing to its competitive edge on 
foreign markets. Another critical subsector – the butter and cheese and dairy industry 
– showed only a 3.6% expansion year-on-year, despite the strong growth in both 
export volumes and prices. 
The fuel industry suffered more than any other Belarusian industry in 2010 because 
of the adjusted Russian crude oil import terms and consequent reduction in crude 
imports. At the start of the year, the economic authorities claimed the deficit of 
Russian crude would be offset by new deliveries from Venezuela, however, the 
country imported only 12.9 million metric tons of crude oil from Russia and 1.8 million 
metric tons of crude from Venezuela in 2010, 14.7 million metric tons in total, which 
compares with 21.5 million metric tons of crude oil imported in 2009. As a result, the 
oil refineries were not using their entire capacity, hence a 21.5% fall in output by the 
oil processing industry and 16.1% drop in production by the entire fuel industry.  
Amid the moderate growth in most of the larger industries (at least compared with the 
original annual targets) and slump in the fuel industry, the overall performance of the 
industrial sector owed its good results to smaller industries traditionally categorized 
as “other industries”3. It was that group of smaller industries that contributed the most 
to the Belarusian industrial growth in 2010.  
4. CORPORATE FINANCE 
A key problem for the financial position of the real sector in 2010 was the increase in 
labor unit costs, promoted by the policy to support real incomes at the previous level, 
despite the slump or low growth rates in most economic sectors. The increase in 
labor unit costs de facto means that compensations paid to workers increased faster 
than labor productivity. In the first half of 2010, the economic authorities were busy 
looking for ways to promote economic growth and relaxed their efforts to ensure a 
wage push (at least compared to the planned rise in incomes), therefore the urgency 
of that problem decreased. In the first six months, labor unit costs even showed a 
decrease year-on year, although they remained above the pre-crisis level.  
In the second half of 2010, the government intensified the wage promotion policy, 
which resulted in an increase in labor unit costs and affected the competitiveness of 
domestic producers. Furthermore, the finances of Belarusian companies were under 
pressure of the increase in costs resulting from higher tariffs on electricity and other 
energy types, a natural result of the rise in prices of Russian natural gas. Companies 
therefore had economic preconditions to raise prices; however, the economic 
authorities resorted to measures, including administrative levers, to restrain price 
increases. Under the circumstances, arrangements to promote demand and the 
consequent increase in costs amid efforts to keep a moderate rise in prices and 
encourage a growth in output resulted in profit restraints. On the other hand, the 
marked reduction in inventories in almost every industry had a favorable impact on 
profitability dynamics. 
Therefore, despite the simultaneous sharp increase in domestic demand and growth 
in the real sector’s production, both sales margin (10.1% in 2010 and 9.9% in 2009) 
and profit margin (6.3% and 6.1%, respectively) indicators remained almost at the 
level of the crisis year, that is, way below the pre-crisis figures. Furthermore, 
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 Other sectors” also include changes in the structure of relative prices. 
throughout the year, there was no evident tendency towards a year-on-year increase 
in profitability rates. This behavior of key indicators characterizing economic 
efficiency accounts for the largely artificial nature of the GDP growth in 2010. 
5. HOUSEHOLDS 
Individual incomes and expenditures 
The first grade wage rate, the benchmark for calculating compensations at 
enterprises, was raised twice in the first half of 2010; however, the total increase 
amounted to 16.8%, which was not much, considering that wages had been last 
increased in the second half of 2008. Therefore, wages increased at a moderate rate 
of 8.1% year-on-year in January-June 2010 (which was not enough to meet the 
ambitious income growth target set for the entire year). In real terms, individual 
incomes, which include wages, social transfers, property and business incomes, etc., 
grew almost at the same rate in January-June, 2010, at 8% year-on-year.  
In the second half of the year, the government pursued a more aggressive income 
policy in a bid to reach the annual target. In September, a special ruling introduced 
adjusting indices to increase compensations for lower income households.  
Two months later, in November 2010, there came a 31.1% hike in the first grade 
wage rate, which brought the overall annual rise in incomes up to 53.2%. Real 
personal incomes rose 15.2% in 2010 from the 2009 level, and real disposable 
incomes (incomes minus taxes) went up 14.9%.  
As we mentioned before, the rise in incomes and corresponding expectations 
resulted in an increase of households’ propensity to consume. The hike in 
consumers’ activity was most obvious in the nonfoods sector: trade in foods showed 
a continuous decrease in volumes in 2010 (as incomes grew), whereas retail 
turnover of non-foods in the same period was increasing. The same trend was 
revealed as a result of sample survey of households: acquisition of nonfoods became 
the key expenditure, and the share of nonfoods in the total spending kept growing.  
Therefore, a considerable proportion of the “new demand” that owed its appearance 
to the government’s demand-promotion policy was shifted to the nonfood market, 
where pressures on price levels increased correspondingly. Another important 
consequence of the rise in incomes was the increase in companies’ propensity to 
import: the share of imported products went up markedly in almost all groups of 
nonfood consumer goods. The aggressive income policy thus led to a substantial 
additional demand for consumer imports.  
At the end of the year, the expectations of higher incomes came true, and 
households’ propensity to consume started to decrease. In the twelve months of 
2010, the share of consumption of commodities and services in total incomes was 
almost the same as in the previous year. However, the trend was not accompanied 
by an increase in savings share (the share of expenditures on taxes and duties went 
up instead), which would have been a welcome development for the country. On the 
contrary, the share of savings in incomes was going down throughout the year, to 
reach 4.5% of incomes, which compares to 5.7% in 2009. 
Also noteworthy is the gap between spending and incomes: expenditures were 4.2% 
above the level of incomes, which was mostly due to the rise in bank credit (by 6.5% 
of the income level). As a result, the tendency towards a decrease in propensity to 
save observed throughout the year grew stronger at the end of the year because of 
the increase in the overall debt under loan agreements, and the population turned 
into a net borrower of resources from banks, whereas previously households’ 
contributions to the banking system used to be in excess of borrowing. The problem 
of insufficient savings, which are traditionally required to finance investments, 
therefore aggravated in the national economy, enhancing current imbalances and 
blighting long-term development prospects. 
Commodity and service markets. Prices. 
Consumer inflation totaled 9.9% in 2010 (as of December), which com pares to 
10.1% in 2009, and the average annual consumer price increase was at 7.8%, down 
from 13% in 2009. On the one hand, this indicates a trend towards a slower increase 
in consumer prices compared to the previous year’s dynamics; however, this may be 
attributed to the high comparative base, especially in the case with the average 
annual indicator. Furthermore, in early 2010, the “crisis impulse” of the previous year 
was still felt, when amid slowly growing or decreasing demand prices behaved 
correspondingly in most markets. On the other hand, if we consider price dynamics in 
2010 alone, it is evident that the price rise accelerated in the course of the year. This 
was a result of a gradual enhancement of measures to shore up the economy, with 
the use of monetary, fiscal and other instruments, including administrative levers.  
Since household consumption was the main growth component of demand during 
most of the year, the inflation overhang in consumer markets emerged quite fast. 
However, the economic authorities used countermeasures to restrain price 
increases; for example, the exchange rate was de facto kept within a narrower band 
than originally planned in the Basic monetary guidelines for the year. In this 
connection, producers had to contain the increase in prices despite the substantial 
increase in demand in order to be able to compete with imports, especially of 
nonfoods, thus restraining profitability in the real sector.  
The government allowed only minor increases in regulated prices in 2010. For 
instance, utility fees, which make up an important part of the consumer price index 
(CPI), mostly remained unchanged in 2010 (only heating rates rose 7.8%; utility fees 
rose only 1.7%).  
Therefore, despite the upward pressure that the growing demand produced on the 
entire range of prices, the economic authorities managed to rein in those trends on 
nonfood markets, as well as in the segment of chargeable services to the population, 
with price increases at 7.4% and 6% year-on-year, respectively. To curb the rise in 
prices on the food market appeared to be much more difficult because of the low 
crop yields both in Belarus and in the wider region. Under the circumstances, 
domestic supply restraint, rise in prices of imported products, as well as the likelihood 
of the failure to meet the domestic requirement (should the price gap with 
neighboring countries widen too much because of the growth in food export) 
accounted for the inevitable increase in prices of most foods. It was the food prices 
that contributed the most in the CPI structure (food prices increased 13.1%).  
Producer prices showed a more significant increase in 2010 compared to consumer 
prices, rising 19.3%. Prices of intermediate materials went up most of the other 
components of the producer price index (PPI), by 25.5%, which is attributable to 
higher energy fees. Therefore, branch-wise, the fuel, chemical, petrochemical 
industries and the electricity sector accounted for most of the price hike. Inflation 
calculated based on the index of producer prices for consumer goods amounted to 
13.5%. The gap between this figure and CPI-based inflation is another indication of 
the inflation overhang in the economy, which in 2010 was contained chiefly by 
profitability restraints and additional burden on the consolidated budget.  
The inflationary pressure became even more evident in the final months of the year, 
and additional efforts were required to deal with it. The faster increase in consumer 
prices, except for December, did not fulfill the inflationary potential, and most of the 
pressure was passed on to the first few months of 2011, given the unprecedented 
arrangements to promote domestic demand in the final month of 2010.  
6. EXTERNAL SECTOR 
Foreign trade  
The current account deficit has been one of the most sensitive issues for the 
Belarusian economy for years. The year 2009 saw truly alarming trends, though, 
when amid the global crisis and foreign demand drops, the Belarusian commodity 
trade deficit widened to 14.8% of GDP, whereas in other transition economies it 
shrank. The adopted scenario of promoting domestic demand left no room for 
measures to address the trade deficit problems in the post-crisis year. However, 
early in 2010, the foreign dynamics proved positive, inspiring optimism and 
expectations of favorable changes and alleviation of the foreign trade predicament: 
the foreign trade deficit went down both in nominal and real terms. As a result, in the 
first quarter of 2010, net exports made a positive contribution to GDP, chiefly 
because of the reduction in Russian oil import at the start of the year, while export of 
refined oil showed a less significant decrease owing to the crude reserves 
accumulated in 2009.  
At the same time, favorable trends were recorded in trade in other commodity groups 
(besides energy). However, the positive trends slackened during the second and 
third quarters, when the foreign trade deficit resumed its steady growth. While in the 
first six months, the foreign trade deficit remained below the level reported in January 
June 2009, the first three quarters saw a 19% expansion in the deficit year-on-year, 
whereas the fourth quarter witnessed an unprecedented growth of 63.2% on the 
fourth quarter of 2009 due to hikes in domestic demand. In January-December, 
foreign trade deficit widened 32.7% on the year, reaching 17.6% of GDP.  
Since the commodity portfolio is grouped into broad economic categories, we are 
able to indicate each commodity group’s contribution to the growing trade deficit: 
trade in energy products accounted for 23% of the deficit growth, which is a result of 
the hikes in import and export prices amid drops in trade volumes; and trade in “other 
intermediate goods” accounted for 21.4% of the increase. From the perspective of 
commodity structure, import of intermediate products was increasing mostly due to 
the overall growth in volumes, as well as rise in ferrous metal prices. In the scope of 
the entire broad commodity group, trade performance deteriorated largely because of 
the increment in the volume of imports, and to a lesser degree due to the rise in 
average import prices (imports rose 26.5% in volume terms, whereas average import 
prices went up 9.7%). The burden of Belarus’ trade in intermediate products, 
commensurable to the impact of energy trade in the overall deficit, indicates that 
import consumption of production is very high in the Belarusian economy. This level 
of import intensity results not only from the need to acquire foreign energy for the 
production sector, but also from additional import of other raw materials and 
components. 
The expansion in Belarus’ foreign trade deficit was also promoted by trade in 
nonfood consumer goods, which accounted for 5.3 points  of the commodity trade 
deficit growth. This trend is conditioned by the growing households’ propensity to 
consume imported products and is mostly associated with the growth in the physical 
volume of imports, by 24.9% year-on-year in this commodity group alone. 
Trade in foods and investment commodities resulted in improvements in trade figures 
(that is, made a negative contribution to the deficit expansion) – by 9.9% and 2.3%, 
respectively. It should be noted that the increase in investment commodity exports 
(which mostly use imported intermediate products) contributed much less to foreign 
trade than imported intermediate materials. In other words, the policy to encourage 
domestic demand also promoted domestic production, which increases import of 
intermediate products to meet the new demand. At the same time, the growth in 
domestic output does not lead to increases in exports that would suffice to offset 
import hikes. As a result, the policy to promote domestic demand and production 
became a crucial factor in the overall growth of the foreign trade deficit in 2010.  
Other foreign flows and balance of payments  
In 2010, Belarus’ current account deficit amounted to USD 8.5 billion, or 15.6% of 
GDP. BoP commodity trade deficit reached USD 9.1 billion, 16.6% of GDP, service 
trade surplus was at USD 1.7 billion, 3.1% of GDP, income balance was in deficit of 
USD 1.3 billion, 2.4% of GDP, and current transfers came to a surplus of USD 0.3 
billion, 0.5% of GDP.  
The negative trends in the external sector were manifested not only in commodity 
trade, but also in service trade. The service trade surplus as a proportion of GDP 
went down 0.5 of a point year-on-year in 2010; furthermore, it offset only 18.7% of 
the commodity trade deficit, whereas in 2009, it was enough to make up for 20%.  
The key reason behind the deterioration of relative results of external service trade 
was the outrunning increase in transport and construction services imports. Despite 
the poorer “transport services” trade balance, compared to the previous year, it was 
the transport sector that provided the bulk of the surplus, with around 97% of the 
entire service trade surplus (the remaining segments performed close to zero).  
Income deficit kept widening in 2010, primarily due to the increase in net capital 
outflows in the “investment incomes” category: in 2010, net capital outflows rose 
21.2% year-on-year, commensurable with net FDI inflows in previous years. This 
attests to the low efficiency of a substantial part of incoming FDI, because at a later 
phase such investments form a reverse flow of investment incomes. It is getting 
increasingly important for the economic authorities to offset this effect, which means 
additional efforts must be taken to facilitate FDI inflows in the projects targeting 
primarily foreign rather than the domestic markets. Furthermore, it is essential that 
additional incentives be offered to investors, in order to ensure reinvestment of 
incomes from FDI and prevent their almost entire outflows as investment incomes.  
In 2010, nearly all possible sources were used to finance the record high current 
account deficit. Most of the financing came from net inflows of loans and credit, at 
USD 3.5 billion, FDI, at USD 1.3 billion, portfolio investments, at USD 1.2 billion, and 
commercial loans, at USD 1.1 billion. 
Commercial banks were the main borrowers on foreign markets, with net inflows of 
foreign resources at USD 2.2 billion. Foreign funds were mostly attracted by 
commercial banks with foreign capital, primarily those with Russian shareholdings, 
which borrowed from parent structures. Those loans were clearly not enough to 
finance the current account deficit. Also, most of the funds raised by domestic banks 
were short-term loans, which could not guarantee stable inflows of finance. 
Therefore, not only banks, but also the central government and the National Bank 
borrowed from external sources.  
Early in 2010, Belarus received the final tranche of the IMF loan; however, it was 
time to start repaying previous loans in the second half of the year, and net inflows of 
foreign resources thus came to a mere USD 500 million. In July-December, as the 
foreign trade situation deteriorated, the NBB had to step in; the central bank 
managed to draw USD 700 million on a net basis. The country owed the substantial 
inflow of “portfolio investments” to the debut placement of sovereign Eurobonds on 
foreign capital markets.  
Nevertheless, despite the employment of new external borrowing instruments, capital 
inflows were not enough to cover the current account deficit. The shortage was 
financed from reserve assets, which fell by USD 800 million in 2010.  
Currency market  
The changing dynamics of foreign trade performance and expectations of the 
population had a prompt impact on foreign exchange trade patterns domestically. In 
the first quarter of the year, foreign trade performance improved because of a 
reduction in sales of crude oil and oil products. However, in the segment of resident 
companies the trend resulted in hikes in net demand for foreign exchange, by 57.8% 
year-on-year, with net demand reaching USD 1.5 billion). This was mostly due to the 
limited increase in the supply of foreign exchange caused by shorter export of refined 
oil. 
At the same time, demand was growing steadily in this segment, despite the 
moderate growth in imports, as the share of foreign exchange acquired to service 
earlier loans markedly increased in the structure of purchases. In other words, active 
borrowing from external sources by privately owned businesses with a view to 
financing the current account deficit led to additional demand for foreign exchange 
from corporate entities.  
The first quarter of the year saw major improvements in the balance of cash 
exchange trade between commercial banks and households compared with the first 
three months of 2009: net supply of cash exchange reached USD 174 million, 
whereas in the same period of 2009, net demand for exchange stood at USD 605 
million. The deficit that was not offset by trade with individuals was covered by 
additional currency sales by banks and NBB’s interventions. A similar situation was 
observed in the second quarter, when resident companies remained the main foreign 
exchange beneficiaries (although their net demand was growing at a much slower 
pace than in the first quarter). The key donors in that period were commercial banks, 
which were taking out new loans from external sources, and the National Bank, 
which continued its efforts to keep the exchange rate stable.  
In the third quarter, corporate demand for foreign exchange grew even faster, 57.6% 
on the third quarter of 2009, or USD 1.2 billion, mostly due to heating of demand and 
additional demand for imports. Furthermore, foreign exchange trade with households 
swung to a deficit of USD 56.3 million (from a surplus, or net supply, of USD 131 
million). The burden on banks and gold and foreign exchange reserves of the country 
therefore markedly increased, and banks started performing “double” functions in 
financing the deficit: they had to form a net supply of foreign exchange on the 
domestic market while placing currency deposits with the National Bank in order for 
the latter to be able to stabilize the amount of net foreign assets.  
The aggressive economic expansion in the fourth quarter brought about a record 
high deficit of foreign exchange trade on the domestic market. Firstly, net demand of 
resident companies more than trebled year-on-year to reach USD 2.8 billion. 
Secondly, the increase in incomes and less optimistic expectations of individuals 
stood behind an unusually high net demand in that segment, reaching USD 1.2 
billion.  
The considerable net supply of foreign exchange by nonresidents, at USD 0.6 billion, 
was also a statistically important source to finance the deficit. The statistical result 
was due to the currency swap deal between the National Bank of Belarus and the 
People’s Bank of China; that money was not part of currency supply on the market, 
but was included in the gold and foreign exchange reserves.  
Financing of the record high deficit was mostly by intensifying the scheme tested in 
the previous quarter: currency supply was formed by commercial banks and NBB, 
which used depleting foreign exchange reserves. Furthermore, to stabilize reserves 
of the central bank, commercial banks placed new deposits with the NBB in addition 
to forming net supply of exchange.  
The disproportions on the money market therefore became the first noticeable result 
of the large scale economic expansion undertaken by the authorities in 2010.  
7. PUBLIC FINANCE 
The main innovations of the state budget2010 were the abolition of transfers to the 
agriculture promotion fund, local tax on sales, tax on sales of vehicles and parking 
fees. To offset the losses, the value added tax was raised to 20% from 18%. 
Importantly, the Social Security Fund was withdrawn from the consolidated budget.  
The new terms of oil trade became a serious shock for the state budget in 2010, as it 
had been drafted based on the 2009 trade terms. The Ministry of Finance estimated 
budget losses close to USD 2 billion, which called for additional revenues from other 
activities or spending cuts; otherwise, the country would have had to put up with a 
higher budget deficit. All of those options were used, with the dominance of the 
increased budget deficit (compared with the originally planned figure). In autumn, the 
Ministry of Finance had to admit that a broader deficit was required, setting the 
forecast between 2% and 3% of GDP (the deficit had originally been planned at 1.5% 
of GDP).  
Consolidated budget deficit amounted to 2.6% of GDP in 2010, compared to 0.7% of 
GDP in 2009. Budget revenues were at 29.9% of GDP, down from 34.2% in the 
previous year, because of drops both in tax-based revenues, to 27.5% of GDP in 
2010 from 30.2% in 2009, and nontax revenues, to 2.3% of GDP from 3.9%. The 
reduction in tax revenues was caused by the cancellation of the export duty on oil 
products, which stood behind the fall in tax revenues from foreign trade to 3.5% of 
GDP from 5.8%.The remaining slight reduction in tax revenues was due to the 
simplification of the tax system. 
In 2010, consolidated budget expenditures amounted to 32.5% of GDP, down from 
36% of GDP in 2009. The decrease was attributed to the reduction in national 
economy expenditures, to 7.6% of GDP from 12%, caused by the abolition of 
subsidies for oil importers. Furthermore, these expenditures fell in December 2010 in 
year-on-year terms because of the curtailment of bank recapitalization volumes, 
traditional for the final months of the year since 2008. In December 2010, around 
BYR 2 trillion was allocated from the budget to support banks (1.2% of GDP), which 
compares to BYR 4 trillion, or 2.9% of GDP, in December 2009.  
The substantial consolidated budget deficit is a new situation for Belarus, as the 
country used to have either a surplus or a balance close to a zero in the previous five 
years. The budget deficit may be interpreted as the government’s losing the room for 
maneuver in the fiscal sector and narrowing of possibilities to manipulate fiscal 
instruments to resist shocks.  
